The origin of the capitalist firm: (Record no. 5853)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01879nam a22003135i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 19539668
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20220719131219.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 170303s2017 nyu 000 0 eng
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER
LC control number 2017935841
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9789811002205
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency DLC
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
Transcribing agency IIMV
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code pcc
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 658.421
Item number ZHA
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Zhang, Weiying.
9 (RLIN) 32090
245 04 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The origin of the capitalist firm:
Remainder of title An entrepreneurial/contractual theory of the firm
Statement of responsibility, etc. by Weiying Zhang
263 ## - PROJECTED PUBLICATION DATE
Projected publication date 1705
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture New York, NY :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2017.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 196p.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Content type code txt
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
Source rdamedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
Source rdacarrier
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. The book addresses the entrepreneurial origin of the capitalist firm and its asymmetric contractual relationships between capitalists, workers, managers and entrepreneurs, and explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship. A hidden action model shows how assigning residual claim to entrepreneurs can provide a better overall incentive; a hidden information model demonstrates that capitalists are given priority and have authority to select the management, because capital can signal entrepreneurial ability; and a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model shows that the equilibrium relationships between different members of the firm depend on the joint distribution of ability, wealth and risk attitudes in the population. Overall, the book reveals that the capitalist firm is more efficient, not only because it provides better incentives but also because it ensures that the most entrepreneurial people control the firm.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Corporate governance.
9 (RLIN) 32091
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Business.
9 (RLIN) 32092
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Entrepreneurship
9 (RLIN) 32093
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
a 0
b ibc
c orignew
d 2
e epcn
f 20
g y-gencatlg
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type Book
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Date acquired Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     Indian Institute of Management Visakhapatnam Indian Institute of Management Visakhapatnam - Andhra University 07/19/2022   658.421 ZHA 001551 07/19/2022 07/19/2022 Book

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