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The origin of the capitalist firm: An entrepreneurial/contractual theory of the firm by Weiying Zhang

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: New York, NY : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017Description: 196pContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 9789811002205
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 658.421 ZHA
Summary: The book addresses the entrepreneurial origin of the capitalist firm and its asymmetric contractual relationships between capitalists, workers, managers and entrepreneurs, and explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship. A hidden action model shows how assigning residual claim to entrepreneurs can provide a better overall incentive; a hidden information model demonstrates that capitalists are given priority and have authority to select the management, because capital can signal entrepreneurial ability; and a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model shows that the equilibrium relationships between different members of the firm depend on the joint distribution of ability, wealth and risk attitudes in the population. Overall, the book reveals that the capitalist firm is more efficient, not only because it provides better incentives but also because it ensures that the most entrepreneurial people control the firm.
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Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode
Book Book Indian Institute of Management Visakhapatnam - Andhra University 658.421 ZHA (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 001551

The book addresses the entrepreneurial origin of the capitalist firm and its asymmetric contractual relationships between capitalists, workers, managers and entrepreneurs, and explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship. A hidden action model shows how assigning residual claim to entrepreneurs can provide a better overall incentive; a hidden information model demonstrates that capitalists are given priority and have authority to select the management, because capital can signal entrepreneurial ability; and a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model shows that the equilibrium relationships between different members of the firm depend on the joint distribution of ability, wealth and risk attitudes in the population. Overall, the book reveals that the capitalist firm is more efficient, not only because it provides better incentives but also because it ensures that the most entrepreneurial people control the firm.

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