000			04063cam a22005295i 4500
001			210460
003			US-djbf
006			m d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			020129s2015 dcu o i001 0 eng
020			_a9781464804618 _c24.99 USD
020			_z9781464804601
035			_a(The World Bank)210460
040			_aDJBF _beng _cDJBF _erda
100	1		_aJaud, Melise. _922405
245	1	0	_aChampions Wanted : _bPromoting Exports in the Middle East and North Africa / _cJaud, Melise;Freund, Caroline
264		1	_aWashington, D.C., _bThe World Bank, _c2015.
300			_a1 online resource (88 pages)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_adata file _2rda
490	1		_aDirections in Development - Trade
520	3		_aWhile other emerging regions have been thriving, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region's aggregate export performance over the past two decades has been consistently weak. Using detailed firm-level export data from Customs administrations, Champions Wanted explains why. One central finding of the book is that the size distribution of MENA's exporting firms is suggestive of a critical weakness at the top. With the exception of the top firm, MENA's elite exporters are smaller and weaker compared to their peers in other regions. The largest exporter is alone at the top-Zidane without a team. MENA countries have failed to nurture a group of export champions, which critically contribute to export success in other regions. Part of the reason behind this weak export performance is the lack of a competitive real exchange rate. The deleterious effects of an uncompetitive currency can be traced all the way down to the firm level, hurting expansion at the intensive and extensive margins and preventing the emergence of export takeoffs. The lack of heavyweight exporters at the top of the distribution also reflects the region's failure to push for trade and business climate reforms energetically. Finally, the region's prevalent cronyism and corruption under pre-Arab Spring regimes (at least) confirms that business-government ties have led to distortionary allocation of favors and rent dissipation by beneficiary firms, with little evidence that those firms have developed into national champions or helped lift the region's export performance. The possibility of state capture in itself should call for caution when advocating any form of government intervention. In contrast, some interventions, such as export promotion programs, show some effects on smaller exporters. However, because these firms are marginal in trade, such programs cannot be game changers. More broadly, the success of MENA countries in promoting export growth and diversification, as well as generating jobs, depends heavily on their ability to create an environment where large firms can invest and expand exports and new, efficient firms can rise to the top. This book offers some policy leads on how to achieve this goal.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		4	_aComparative Advantage _922406
650		4	_aExchange Rate _922407
650		4	_aExport Champions _922408
650		4	_aExport Growth _922409
650		4	_aExport-Promotion _922410
650		4	_aExporter Dynamics _922411
650		4	_aFirm Size Distribution _922412
650		4	_aFirm-Level Data _922413
650		4	_aGlobal Value Chains _922414
650		4	_aInternational Economics and Trade _922415
650		4	_aJob Creation _922416
650		4	_aMacroeconomics and Economic Growth _922417
650		4	_aPrivate Sector Development _922418
650		4	_aTrade Policy _922419
650		4	_aTrade Sanctions _922420
700	1		_aFreund, Caroline. _922421
700	1		_aJaud, Melise. _922405
776	0	8	_aPrint Version: _z9781464804601
830		0	_aDirections in Development - Trade _922422
830		0	_aWorld Bank e-Library. _922423
856	4	0	_uhttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-1-4648-0460-1
999			_c4752 _d4752