000			01879nam a22003135i 4500
001			19539668
005			20220719131219.0
008			170303s2017 nyu 000 0 eng
010			_a 2017935841
020			_a9789811002205
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cIIMV
042			_apcc
082			_a658.421 _bZHA
100			_aZhang, Weiying. _932090
245	0	4	_aThe origin of the capitalist firm: _bAn entrepreneurial/contractual theory of the firm _cby Weiying Zhang
263			_a1705
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg, _c2017.
300			_a196p.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
520			_aThe book addresses the entrepreneurial origin of the capitalist firm and its asymmetric contractual relationships between capitalists, workers, managers and entrepreneurs, and explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship. A hidden action model shows how assigning residual claim to entrepreneurs can provide a better overall incentive; a hidden information model demonstrates that capitalists are given priority and have authority to select the management, because capital can signal entrepreneurial ability; and a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model shows that the equilibrium relationships between different members of the firm depend on the joint distribution of ability, wealth and risk attitudes in the population. Overall, the book reveals that the capitalist firm is more efficient, not only because it provides better incentives but also because it ensures that the most entrepreneurial people control the firm.
650			_aCorporate governance. _932091
650			_aBusiness. _932092
650			_aEntrepreneurship _932093
906			_a0 _bibc _corignew _d2 _eepcn _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c5853 _d5853